

But all these children knew well enough how often teasing would have passed over into real cruelty but for the restraining presence of Mrs. I. or Miss B. One hears, now and then from other sources how cruel children can be to their smaller playmates, when they have the chance. (Note, for example, the incident on p. 44.)

A great deal of the make-believe aggression, however, was true play, and independent of any real situation. These games of " shooting " and " playing battleships " are fore-runners of the older boys' " Red Indians " and " English and Germans " as well as of the more conventional competitive games. In them the phantasy of power finds an admirable outlet.

An interesting point about Harold's invented game of running round the room and threatening " to blow up " the tower he had built (20.1.25) is the part he assigns to Mrs. I. She was asked to sit near and say protestingly each time he passed, " No, *no* ! " That is to say, whilst he might play out his phantasy of omnipotent aggression, she was to represent the restraining influences within his mind, his conscience (super-ego).¹ And in the play, he did not in fact try to carry out his threat—her protests were allowed to be effective. In

¹ A word may be said here about the term *super-ego*, by which we are enabled to refer to those psychic trends of anxiety which represent, at varying levels of the mental life, the familiar fact of " conscience ". Many psychologists object strongly to the use of entities of this kind, and feel happier when mental processes are expressed in purely transitive terms, i.e. as events. I myself share this feeling, and have indeed a strong prejudice against personifications in general. But whilst I have little doubt that the processes to which we refer by the term *super-ego* could in fact be expressed transitively as a series of events, there are certain reasons why I am content to accept and use this term, as well as to refer to the undifferentiated instinctual trends as a whole as the *id*, and to distinguish both from the *ego*.

These reasons are two : (a) Not only are these terms

an extremely
convenient shorthand for the processes in question, but
(b) their actual
substantivity represents a very significant psychological
truth, namely,
the experience of *the divided self*, the actual
phenomenological experience
of one "part" of the self pulling against another "part". Critics
have often said that psycho-analytic theory uses far too
many dramatic
concepts. Mental life, however, *is* dramatic—it is
indeed the source
of all drama. No one who has, with any degree of self-
awareness,
struggled with his wishes as against his notions of what
he ought to do,
can doubt the reality of this drama. Moreover, the
primitive mechan-
isms of introjection and projection, and scarcely less so
that of repres-
sion, often operate with such large areas of the total
personality that
one is justified, for the purpose of understanding, in
treating these three
subdivisions of the total psyche, the *super-ego*, the *id*
and the *ego*, as
relatively distinct parts. As far as conscious life is
concerned, it is,
e.g., possible at any one time for the whole of the
wish-self to be